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1. INTRODUCTION
The balance of payments, insofar as it is a 
record of a country’s trade and financial trans-
actions with other countries, is an important 
source of information for evaluating the eco-
nomic situation. However, analysing these 
data is by no means simple, since they can 
be interpreted in different ways. In a world 
in which most trade and financial flows are 
channelled through private agents, a cur-
rent-account deficit is only a cause for con-
cern insofar as it casts doubt on the sustaina-
bility of the exchange-rate regime (or presag-
es large movements in the exchange rate), or 
is indicative of serious competitiveness prob-
lems. Either way, it is difficult to make a diag-
nosis solely on the basis of the information 
provided by the balance of payments and 
other variables need to be taken into account 
for a better grounded assessment. It is there-
fore complicated to specify under what condi-
tions the financial markets perceive that the 
situation of the external sector is not sustain-
able and a sudden exchange rate correction 
may take place. A large and persistent cur-
rent-account deficit may be symptomatic of 
the fact that national output lacks competitive-
ness, but it may also arise from strong growth 
in national investment, financed partly by ex-
ternal savings, that will in the medium term 
improve competitiveness and restore equilib-
rium to the external accounts. Moreover, it is 
difficult to assess to what extent it is current-
account transactions that give rise to a finan-
cial position that has to be covered with net 
inflows of capital or, by contrast, it is cross-
border financial flows that drive current-ac-
count developments.
Section 2 of this article analyses which 
variables help to characterise the treatment 
merited by the analysis of the balance of pay-
ments. The case of a developed economy 
with a flexible exchange-rate regime, such as 
the United States and the euro area, is exam-
ined in Section 3, while Section 4 considers 
the case of countries linked by a common 
currency, such as those that have joined the 
euro area. In the euro-area countries, while 
the single currency eliminates the risk of the 
external deficit giving rise to a sharp correc-
tion in the exchange rate, the competitive-
ness problems that may build up are, poten-
tially, more serious, since there is no possibil-
ity of correcting them through a currency de-
valuation. The conclusions are set out in 
Section 5.
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2.  BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS 
DISEQUILIBRIUM AS AN INDICATOR 
OF INSTABILITY
The world has seen a number of economic 
crises in recent years (Mexico in 1994, Russia 
and South-East Asia in 1998, Argentina in 
2001). Among the factors that have set these 
crises off have been balance-of-payments dis-
equilibria. Although the existence of a large 
current-account deficit was not the heart of the 
problem in every case, these crises were trig-
gered by sudden changes in cross-border fi-
nancial flows; countries that normally received 
net investment from the rest of the world be-
gan to experience massive flights of capital, 
which led to sharp exchange rate deprecia-
tions. A common feature of these countries is 
that they were emerging economies (or, at 
least, not full members of the group of industr-
ialised countries), they were dependent on ex-
ternal financing and they had exchange rate 
regimes that linked the local currency more or 
less tightly to some other foreign currency 
(normally the US dollar). The industrialised 
economies, meanwhile, have not experienced 
similar balance-of-payments crises in recent 
years. In Europe, the last episode with some-
what similar characteristics was during the pe-
riod 1992-1994, when a number of factors led 
to the crisis of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
of the European Monetary System and various 
countries abandoned this mechanism or deval-
ued their currencies.
Various factors can be mentioned whose 
presence generally makes a balance-of-pay-
ments disequilibrium worrying (1). The crucial 
element is probably the exchange-rate regime 
chosen, since this determines the extent to 
which changes in the relative demand for fi-
nancial assets denominated in domestic and 
foreign currency can correct themselves 
through exchange-rate movements. Under 
fixed and semi-fixed exchange-rate regimes, in 
which the authorities are committed to main-
taining a greater or lesser degree of exchange-
rate stability, the central bank must respond to 
changes in net capital flows by intervening 
(whether automatically, as in the case of a cur-
rency board, or discretionally) in the money or 
foreign exchange markets, in order to keep the 
exchange rate at the desired level. The chanc-
es of this strategy succeeding are limited, 
since central bank interventions are restricted 
by the availability of reserves or by the difficulty 
of maintaining severe monetary squeezes in-
definitely. In fact, experience shows that if, as a 
consequence of balance-of-payments disequi-
libria, there is strong downward pressure on 
the exchange rate, then usually it will eventu-
ally be devalued.
The degree of stability of the capital inflows 
is also fundamental in any assessment of the 
importance of an external disequilibrium (2). 
This element is bound up with the credibility 
enjoyed by the national authorities, the coun-
try’s tradition of macroeconomic and political 
stability, the position of the national economy 
in the world, its specialisation, etc. Obviously, 
the more volatile these capital inflows and the 
more they are linked to high returns on invest-
ments with a speculative content, the greater 
the risk that they will be reversed and so gen-
erate a balance-of-payments crisis. In this 
sense, current-account deficits may contain an 
element of vulnerability if external financing is 
considered to be more unstable than domestic 
financing. This tends to be the case when capi-
tal inflows are strongly influenced by the level 
of the exchange rate or by expectations of its 
future course.
In the industrialised countries these factors 
are generally of little significance. First, in the 
case of the three large economic areas, the 
exchange rates between their currencies (the 
euro, the dollar and the yen) are flexible, so 
that the central banks of these zones do not 
have exchange rate targets to defend and 
capital inflows and outflows lead to changes 
in exchange rates that can, if necessary, cor-
rect any external disequilibrium by them-
selves. Second, the high living standards, 
price stability and high degree of economic 
policy credibility in these countries are condu-
cive to the stable financing of any external 
deficit. Short-term capital inflows with a more 
speculative content do exist, but their impor-
tance is smaller, so that it is less likely that 
there will be a sudden change in market sen-
timent prompting substantial changes to in-
vestment patterns in these zones. Obviously 
this does not mean that a persistent external 
deficit will not, on occasions, require an ad-
justment in these countries, but such adjust-
ments will usually be less traumatic than in 
emerging economies. This article focuses on 
two cases of particular interest among this 
group of industrialised countries: the United 
States and the euro area.
(1) The current-account deficit is the indicator usually 
used to assess the external disequilibrium or vulnerability of 
an economy to changes in financial markets’ sentiment, al-
though even without a current-account deficit a country can 
still be affected by sudden changes in the direction of finan-
cial flows.
(2) In fact, an indicator that is also frequently used to 
measure external equilibrium is the basic balance. This is 
obtained by summing the balance on current account and 
the net flows of investment that are judged to be more per-
manent, such as direct and portfolio investment.
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3.  EXTERNAL DISEQUILIBRIUM UNDER 
A REGIME OF MACROECONOMIC 
STABILITY AND FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE 
RATES: THE CASE OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EURO AREA
The euro area has run a current-account 
surplus in every year since 1993, with the sole 
exception of 2000 (see lower panel of Chart 1). 
As mentioned above, the fact that it does not 
need to resort to the savings of the rest of the 
world to finance its domestic investment does 
not necessarily mean that the euro area is shel-
tered from the effects of changes in the direc-
tion of international financial flows on the ex-
change rate and the economic situation (3). 
Moreover, it is very important to know to what 
extent the introduction of the euro has changed 
the ability of the member countries to run bal-
ance-of-payments deficits, something that will 
be analysed in the following section.
The United States, meanwhile, has been 
running a very large deficit on current account, 
for more than two decades now (see Chart 2). 
This deficit has, on occasions, been interpreted 
as being a consequence of the dollar’s central 
role in the international financial system and of 
the dynamism of the US economy. This makes 
dollar assets highly attractive, so that capital 
flows into the United States, leading to appreci-
ation of its currency and, in short, a deficit 
emerges. In the case of the United States, this 
chronic balance-of-payments disequilibrium on 
current account has not only not led to dollar 
weakness, but the dollar has instead proven it-
self relatively strong over prolonged periods.
In recent years, the large and widening ex-
ternal deficit in the United Sates has been a 
cause for concern for international economic 
authorities. The fear is that patterns of invest-
ment in the US economy might change signifi-
cantly, giving rise to a sudden movement in the 
exchange rate, which could upset world eco-
nomic growth. In fact, analysis of the external 
sector of the industrialised economies in recent 
decades shows that adjustment typically takes 
place when the current-account deficit reaches 
around 5% of GDP, which is the level the US 
deficit has been at in the last few years [see 
Freund (2000)]. Moreover, while the large cur-
rent-account deficit that existed almost through-
out the 1990s involved recourse to external 
saving given the insufficiency of domestic sav-
ing to finance increasing investment, the recent 
decline in investment has not been accompa-
nied by any moderation in the deficit. The sharp 
deterioration in the US international investment 
position is also a sign of the difficulty of main-
taining the current situation, although the in-
come that has to be paid on the liabilities with 
the rest of the world is similar to that accruing 
on US financial assets with the rest of the world 
(see Chart 3).
As mentioned above, the nature of the capi-
tal flows is also an important factor in any as-
sessment of an external disequilibrium. In re-
cent years, the United States has been the re-
cipient of large capital inflows in the form of 
share acquisitions (through direct and portfolio 
investment), associated with the boom in the 
high-technology sectors (see Chart 4). Indeed, 
the high potential growth rate of the US econo-
my and the dollar’s safe-haven status (which 
means, for example, that the dollar is the main 
central bank reserve currency) are factors that 
tend to encourage a stable demand for assets 
issued by US agents. In 2001, however, the pat-
tern of previous years changed and the bulk of 
the capital inflows were channelled through 
debt (loans and fixed-income securities), while 
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(3) In fact, the basic balance showed a large deficit dur-
ing the period 1998-2001, which can partly be explained by 
the significant depreciation of the euro in this period. The 
return to surplus on the basic balance, towards the end of 
2001, coincided with the start of a period in which the euro 
recovered somewhat on the foreign exchange markets.
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direct investment and the purchase of shares 
dropped significantly.
In order to assess the likelihood of the defi-
cit being reduced it is also worth analysing the 
financial position of resident sectors. Chart 5 
shows how the widening of the US deficit up to 
2001 was attributable to a substantial reduc-
tion in the net lending of corporations and, es-
pecially, of households, which was only partly 
offset by the improvement in public finances. In 
this respect, the sharp increase in the indebt-
edness of the private sector over the last dec-
ade has been notable. In the case of house-
holds, outstanding debt rose to 75% of GDP, 
and in that of non-financial corporations, to 
somewhat less than 70%. While the recently 
recorded levels of indebtedness of corpora-
tions are similar to those of the late 1980s, 
those of households are much higher than the 
levels seen in recent decades, while the sav-
ings ratio is much lower (see lower panel of 
Chart 5). Even if it is argued that, were the 
capital gains obtained on the holdings of the 
real and financial assets to be taken into ac-
count, the fall in the household saving ratio 
would not have been so significant, this ratio 
can still be expected to pick up. In the absence 
of an expansionary fiscal policy, this would 
lead to adjustment in the external deficit.
In short, it has been seen that the informa-
tion on the level of the current-account deficit in 
economies such as the United States is insuffi-
cient to assess its sustainability or the possibili-
ties for a more or less immediate correction. 
Such an assessment requires further informa-
tion, relating to the reasons for the deficit and 
the use that is being made of the external sav-
ings. In this case, analysis of balance sheets 
(especially those of households, in the United 
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States) provides significant information on pos-
sible future developments in the current-account 
deficit. This additional information, as will be 
seen in the following section, is also crucial to 
any assessment of changes in the balance of 
payments of the member countries of a mone-
tary union.
4.  EXTERNAL DISEQUILIBRIUM IN THE 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF A MONETARY 
UNION: THE CASE OF THE EURO AREA
In a monetary union, the member countries 
give up one of the main adjustment mecha-
nisms for resolving their balance-of-payments 
problems, namely depreciation of their ex-
change rate, at least insofar as the relationship 
between their own currencies is concerned. At 
the same time, these problems become less 
acute. In particular, in those countries with less 
tradition of macroeconomic stability, the impos-
sibility of depreciation of a country’s currency 
against those of its partners in the union elimi-
nates the exchange risk premium for investors. 
This reduces the level of interest rates required 
and encourages larger and more stable flows of 
capital into these economies, which would oth-
erwise be subject to very strict scrutiny by the 
markets. In this respect, countries that have 
been successfully incorporated into a monetary 
union governed by a credible economic policy 
geared to macroeconomic stability should find it 
easier to obtain capital inflows to finance do-
mestic investment, so that the sustainable level 
of the external deficit is higher.
In fact, the external sector of a country be-
longing to a monetary union could be analysed 
as though the economic relations of one region 
with others in the same country and with third 
countries were being examined. Indeed, it might 
be inferred that the importance of a current-ac-
count deficit in a monetary union is significantly 
lower. However, it should not be forgotten that, 
unlike in the case of the regions of a particular 
country, two significant instruments of adjust-
ment may not be available to a monetary union. 
These are a fiscal policy for the union as a 
whole with sufficient stabilising potential and a 
high degree of labour mobility. As a result, the 
presence of a persistent current-account deficit 
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in one country of a monetary union does not 
stop being relevant; it may be a sign of competi-
tiveness problems that are holding down the 
country’s growth potential and the adjustment 
required to correct such problems may be more 
costly than in the case of an economy with its 
own currency.
Looking at the euro area balance of pay-
ments, it can be seen that the general overall 
balance in the area is the result of a surplus in 
some countries and a relatively large deficit in 
others (see Chart 6) (4). In particular, as a per-
centage of GDP, Finland, Belgium and the 
Netherlands had the largest current-account 
surpluses in 2001, while the largest deficits 
were those of Portugal and Greece. Spain, 
along with Austria, also ran a large deficit; in-
deed Spain was the country with the largest 
deficit in absolute terms, but as a percentage of 
GDP it was much smaller than in Portugal and 
Greece. Clearly, there is no coincidence in the 
fact that this group includes the countries with the 
lowest income per capita in the euro area; these 
countries have the smallest capital endowments 
and the greatest possibilities for investment and 
high returns, which encourages the tapping of 
external saving so that headway can continue 
to be made in the process of real convergence. 
These countries have traditionally displayed 
persistent balance-of-payments current-account 
deficits (see Chart 7). Moreover, it is in these 
countries that membership of the euro area has 
represented a radical change in the economic 
policy regime, since they did not have a long 
tradition of stability, and the euro area has, 
among other consequences, entailed a sharp 
decline in interest rates, which has boosted do-
mestic demand and indebtedness (5). Chart 8 
shows how these three countries have, since 
1997, displayed much higher growth of domes-
tic demand, investment and bank lending to the 
private sector than the euro area as a whole.
In some cases, such as Spain, the current 
level of the current-account deficit is the result 
of strong growth in domestic investment, which 
has not been offset by domestic saving. In fact, 
the latter has only held steady thanks to the 
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(4) In the country-level figures, the current-account bal-
ance vis-à-vis the rest of the world includes the balance 
vis-à-vis the other euro area countries. This means that it is 
impossible to establish whether the countries running a cur-
rent-account deficit are also those contributing to the euro 
area deficit vis-à-vis the rest of the world, since an individual 
country’s deficit can be made up of a surplus vis-à-vis the 
countries outside the euro area and a larger deficit vis-à-vis 
the rest of the euro area.
(5) In Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) it is argued that 
the increasing economic integration between the euro area 
countries has led to a substantial reduction in the correla-
tion between investment and national saving.
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contribution of general government in recent 
years (see Chart 9). In Portugal and Greece, 
moreover, part of the external deficit is ex-
plained by a reduction in national saving, and in 
particular, in private saving.
Unlike the situation in countries with their 
own currency, the external deficit of these states 
is hardly going to affect the euro exchange rate. 
First, this deficit has, up until now, been offset 
by the surplus in other countries. Second, those 
countries with high deficits represent a small 
part of the euro area as a whole, so that it 
seems unlikely that they set the trend for the 
external sector of the area (see, also, footnote 
4). As seen in the lower panel of Chart 6, al-
though their deficit is high in terms of GDP, in 
absolute terms Greece and Portugal account 
for a relatively small part of the overall deficit of 
the area. Also, as the case of the United States 
shows, even if these national deficits give rise to 
a euro area deficit, it would still not be possible 
to predict the short-run or even medium-run 
path of the exchange rate.
However, this does not mean that the point 
will not be reached where an adjustment of 
these disequilibria becomes necessary. In prin-
ciple, the most reasonable channels of adjust-
ment should be national. Insofar as the currency 
of a country with balance-of-payments problems 
is the same as that of other countries, it is un-
likely that these problems will reduce the attrac-
tiveness of assets denominated in that curren-
cy (6). In a monetary union, the importance of 
the balance of payments is smaller insofar as 
the solvency of the borrower is much more im-
portant than its nationality. Within the group of 
issuers active on international markets (large 
firms and credit institutions), what is important 
is their earnings prospects, and these, in a glo-
balised economic system, are less and less as-
sociated with the economic developments in a 
particular country. Obviously, there may contin-
ue to be important national ties, because a sig-
nificant part of the business of some credit insti-
tutions and corporations may still be concen-
trated in a national market.
In this respect, part of the process of cor-
rection of the external disequilibrium can be 
expected to be determined by the market itself. 
Thus, if credit institutions consider that their 
exposure to the sector of non-financial corpo-
rations and households is excessive, they will 
reduce the available credit or will make it more 
expensive, which will restrict domestic demand 
and, as a result, the external disequilibrium. 
Participants in securities markets will perform 
a similar task of risk monitoring and assess-
ment. Insofar as this process may not be auto-
matic or effective, the authorities (and in par-
ticular, the central bank, as guarantor of finan-
cial stability) shall perform a very important 
role; first, carrying out a rigorous banking su-
pervision task, to ensure that institutions are 
properly valuing the risks implicit in their loans; 
and, second, analysing the financial situation 
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(6) That said, it is not possible to rule out the external 
disequilibrium of a specific country eventually affecting the 
other countries of the zone. In fact, some spillover effects 
can be expected, the strength of which will depend on the 
causes of the disequilibrium, its potential consequences for 
the exchange rate and interest rates, and any implications 
that may arise from the adjustment measures taken to cor-
rect the disequilibrium [see Catte (1998)].
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of the economic sectors and alerting to any 
potential sustainability problems that may be 
detected. Finally, the more reliable and com-
prehensive the information required from bor-
rowers the more efficient will be the assess-
ment of risks by the market.
In the case of the three countries men-
tioned above there have been no problems fi-
nancing the current-account deficit, although 
external borrowing (as opposed to direct in-
vestment or the sale of shares) has been the 
instrument used most to attract savings from 
the rest of the world. In terms of their interna-
tional investment position, the cumulative cur-
rent-account deficit has led to a substantial 
decline in Greece and Portugal, which came to 
a halt in 2001 (see Chart 10), while in Spain 
this position has remained stable despite the 
external deficit recorded.
In terms of the yields required on financial 
assets, the market does not seem to be penal-
ising the securities issued by these countries. 
For example, the interest rate differentials on 
long-term government debt vis-à-vis Germany 
are still low and their trend is downwards (see 
Chart 11). In the case of Portugal, there was a 
temporary increase in mid-2002 linked to the 
unfavourable public finance developments in 
this country, which led to the initiation of the ex-
cessive deficit procedure to correct the situa-
tion. As for equity markets, the performance of 
the Lisbon and Athens stock markets in the last 
two years has been negative, but very similar to 
that of European indices, such as the Euro 
Stoxx. This seems to imply that the financial 
markets are not directly assessing the overall fi-
nancing requirements of each country, but rath-
er the specific financial position of each agent 
seeking funds.
In short, analysis of the balance of pay-
ments of the countries of a monetary union is 
still relevant. Even if the external disequilibrium 
of national economies is not going to have im-
plications for the sustainability of the exchange 
rate, the current-account deficit is, although an 
imprecise one, an initial indicator of the com-
petitiveness problems a country may be suffer-
ing from, which are potentially more worrying 
within a monetary union. Obviously, it is diffi-
cult to determine to what extent the external 
deficit is a symptom of such competitiveness 
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problems or, rather, an efficient response by 
agents to a new environment, characterised by 
lower interest rates and greater investment op-
portunities, which enable a higher current-ac-
count deficit to be sustained in the long run. 
Such an assessment needs to be based on a 
large number of indicators, including both rela-
tive-price and market-share variables, as well 
as other variables relating to the financial posi-
tion of corporations and households, and the 
solvency of credit institutions, their position in 
international markets and the maturity of their 
debts. Developments in the prices of national 
assets (government debt, private securities, 
the stock market) relative to the euro area as a 
whole and the ratings assigned to firms by rat-
ing agencies also offer relevant information on 
investor confidence in the domestic economic 
situation.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The information provided by the balance of 
payments is still useful for economic analysis 
and for economic policy formulation. However, 
its relative importance varies greatly, according 
to the degree of development and the design of 
economic policy in the country concerned. Thus, 
the current-account deficit is still a crucial indi-
cator in emerging countries, in states with fixed 
or semi-fixed exchange-rate regimes and in 
those with highly volatile cross-border financial 
flows.
By contrast, in countries with flexible ex-
change-rate regimes, a high degree of develop-
ment and economic policy credibility, or in those 
belonging to a monetary union with these char-
acteristics, the possibility of a current-account 
imbalance giving rise to a balance-of-payments 
crisis is more remote. In these countries, the 
level of the external deficit is a poor indicator of 
the magnitude of the accumulated problems or 
imbalances, and the latter must be assessed on 
the basis of a wider set of indicators taking into 
account, among other elements, the financial 
position of national sectors (households, corpo-
rations and credit institutions) and the prices of 
national assets. In these circumstances, the 
current-account deficit is just one more indicator 
of the nature of the difficulties facing each econ-
omy and, in itself, provides little information on 
the need for its correction or on its potential ef-
fects.
In the case of a monetary union, such as the 
euro area, the information provided by the bal-
ance of payments is even less conclusive and 
needs to be supplemented by analysis of as-
pects of a more microeconomic type linked to 
financial stability, relating to the assessment of 
the risks and the vulnerability of the main eco-
nomic sectors. These aspects, in the long run, 
determine the extent to which a specific level of 
the current account is or is not worrying. The 
greater ease of financing the external deficit 
within a monetary union in no way reduces the 
potential competitiveness problems that may 
arise in a national economy belonging to the 
euro area. Besides, the difficulty of detecting 
these problems and the higher potential cost of 
the adjustments needed to resolve them within 
a monetary union (given the impossibility of an 
exchange-rate devaluation) mean that the situa-
tion needs to be evaluated early so that solu-
tions can be implemented promptly, thereby re-
ducing the potential cost of adjustment.
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